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DLD-067        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-3277 
 ___________ 
 
 ASSEM A. ABULKHAIR, 




LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY;  
ADA PRIDDY, Adjuster; KAREN KUEBLER, Esq.;  
THE LAW OFFICES OF LINDA BAUMAN, ESQ. 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. Civil No. 10-cv-00146) 
 District Judge: Honorable Jose L. Linares 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
 Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
December 16, 2010 
 Before:  BARRY, FISHER AND STAPLETON, Circuit Judges 
 







 Assem A. Abulkhair, proceeding pro se, appeals two orders of the District Court.  
The first order denied Abulkhair‟s motion for additional time to appeal the order that 
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dismissed his complaint, and the second order imposed restrictions upon Abulkhair‟s 
right to file future complaints in the district court.  For the reasons set forth below, we 
will take summary action, see 3d Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6, and we will affirm in 
part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.   
I. 
 Abulkhair commenced this suit in January 2010 by filing a pro se complaint under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law against Liberty Mutual Insurance Company and other 
defendants.  The claims asserted stem from a dispute over insurance coverage for a 1998 
car accident that Abulkhair was involved in with an uninsured motorist.  By order entered 
February 11, 2010, the District Court granted Abulkhair leave to proceed in forma 
pauperis (“IFP”) and dismissed his complaint sua sponte for lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction.  The District Court determined that the claims asserted were substantially 
similar to claims that the Court had dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction in a 
prior suit by Abulkhair.  Although Abulkhair named a new defendant and added state law 
claims in the present suit, the District Court concluded that it remained without subject-
matter jurisdiction, and it dismissed the complaint with prejudice.  Furthermore, because 
Abulkhair had commenced eight suits in the preceding six months related to the same car 
accident, and a total of fifteen suits in the District of New Jersey since 2002, the District 
Court ordered Abulkhair to show cause why he should not be required to obtain court 
approval before filing any future complaint related to this car accident. 
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 On March 31, 2010, Abulkhair filed a notice of appeal from the February 11 order.  
The notice of appeal was untimely filed more than thirty days after entry of the February 
11 order, see Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), and this Court dismissed the appeal for lack of 
appellate jurisdiction.  See C.A. No. 10-1949. 
 Meanwhile, on April 12, 2010, Abulkhair filed a motion for an extension of time 
to appeal the February 11 order or to reopen the appeal period.  See Fed. Rules of App. P. 
4(a)(5) and (a)(6).  He submitted an Affidavit dated March 29, 2010, in which he averred 
that the February 11 order “has never been served upon the Plaintiff by neither the Clerk, 
nor [opposing] counsel.”  Docket #9 at 1.  Abulkhair claimed that he first received notice 
of the order on March 29 when it was handed to him by the court clerk.  Id.  Defendants 
opposed the motion, arguing that Abulkhair is a “serial litigator” who had failed to 
monitor his case, and he should not be allowed “to convert the 30-day deadline for filing 
notices of appeal into a 60-day deadline[.]”  Docket #12 at 3-4.  Abulkhair filed a reply in 
which he noted that defendants did not dispute his claim that he failed to receive timely 
notice of the February 11 order.  Docket #13. 
 In his March 29 Affidavit, Abulkhair also expressed opposition to entry of the 
proposed injunction, arguing that he has “never filed a single frivolous suit against 
anyone,” and that his conduct does not support a restriction upon future filings.  Docket 
#9 at 5-6.  Abulkhair had argued earlier, in his reply to defendants‟ opposition to his IFP 
motion, that his prior suits involved different claims and defendants, and that he believes 
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there is a basis for exercising federal subject-matter jurisdiction.  See Docket #6 at 1-2. 
 By order entered July 23, 2010, the District Court denied Abulkhair‟s motion for 
additional time to appeal.  Addressing the motion solely as a request for an extension 
time to appeal under Rule 4(a)(5), the District Court held that Abulkhair failed to show 
excusable neglect.  Among other things, the District Court explained that “an excuse that 
Plaintiff did not receive a copy of the Order in time, without additional factual support or 
information, is an excuse that is easily manufactured,” and that Abulkhair “has not 
demonstrated that he made any efforts to monitor the docket in this matter.”   
 By separate order entered July 22, 2010, the District Court entered an injunction 
requiring Abulkhair to obtain court approval before filing future complaints related to the 
same car accident.  The District Court did not address Abulkhair‟s objections to the 
injunction because it found that “Plaintiff did not respond to the Order to Show Cause.”   
 Abulkhair timely filed a notice of appeal from the July 22 and July 23 orders. 
II. 
 We have appellate jurisdiction because the orders appealed are “final decisions” 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review for abuse of discretion a decision to deny a motion 
for an extension of time to appeal, Ramseur v. Beyer, 921 F.2d 504, 506 n.2 (3d Cir. 
1990), and a motion to reopen the appeal period, United States v. Rinaldi, 447 F.3d 192, 
195 (3d Cir. 2006), while our review is plenary over the district court‟s application and 
interpretation of the governing rules, Pedereaux v. Doe, 767 F.2d 50, 51 (3d Cir. 1985).  
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We review for abuse of discretion a decision to impose restrictions upon a litigant‟s right 
to file future litigation.  Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 901 F.2d 329, 331 (3d Cir. 1990). 
III. 
 (i) Order denying the motion to extend or reopen time to appeal 
 Abulkhair moved to extend the time to appeal under Rule 4(a)(5) and to reopen the 
time to appeal under Rule 4(a)(6) based on an allegation that he did not receive notice of 
the February 11 order until March 29, 2010.  The District Court addressed the motion 
solely under Rule 4(a)(5) and denied relief.  After a review of the record, we conclude 
that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in holding that Abulkhair failed to 
establish excusable neglect to support extending the appeal period under Rule 4(a)(5).
1
  
                                                 
1
 “This court interprets Rule 4(a)(5) to require a finding of excusable neglect in those 
instances where the court, after weighing the relevant considerations is satisfied that 
counsel has exhibited substantial diligence, professional competence and has acted in 
good faith to conform his or her conduct in accordance with the rule, but as the result 
of some minor neglect, compliance was not achieved.”  Consol. Freightways Corp. v. 
Larson, 827 F.2d 916, 920 (3d Cir. 1987).  The District Court cited Abulkhair‟s 
extensive litigation history, his awareness of the governing rules, and the absence of a 
showing that he had made any effort to monitor the docket in this case.  This record 
adequately supports the refusal to find excusable neglect.  See, e.g., United States ex 
rel. McAllan v. City of New York, 248 F.3d 48, 53 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[A]ppellant‟s 
failure to file a timely notice of appeal is not excused by what he characterizes as the 
„serious administrative errors‟ and docketing irregularities of the … clerk‟s office, 
because parties have an obligation to monitor the docket sheet to inform themselves of 
the entry of orders they wish to appeal.”); see also Vianello v. Pacifico, 905 F.2d 699, 
701 (3d Cir. 1990) (explaining that a “district court may take into account, as one 
factor in making its decision [under Rule 4(a)(5)], the Clerk‟s failure to give notice of 
entry of judgment, but that the district court is not required to extend the time for filing 




Accordingly, we will affirm the July 23 order insofar as the District Court denied Rule 
4(a)(5) relief.   
 As noted, however, the basis for Abulkhair‟s motion was an assertion that he was 
not served with notice of a court order -- an assertion that directly implicates Rule 
4(a)(6).  “Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6) provides a mechanism for granting an extension of time 
when a party would be unfairly deprived of an appeal because of the failure of a court 
clerk.”  Marcangelo v. Boardwalk Regency, 47 F.3d 88, 90 (3d Cir. 1995).  The District 
Court erred in failing to address Abulkhair‟s request for Rule 4(a)(6) relief. 
 Under Rule 4(a)(6), a district court may reopen the appeal period for fourteen days 
if it finds that the party did not receive notice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
77(d) of a judgment or order within twenty-one days after its entry, and that no party 
would be prejudiced.  Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6)(A), (C).
2
  The motion to reopen must be 
filed by the earlier of 180 days following entry of the judgment or order or fourteen days 
after the party receives notice of its entry.  Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6)(B). 
 The present record does not clearly foreclose Abulkhair from meeting the three 
requirements for Rule 4(a)(6) relief, and, moreover, it is unclear whether relief would be 
appropriate as a matter of discretion even if he meets the Rule‟s requirements.  See Arai 
                                                 
2
 Rule 77(d) provides that, “[i]mmediately after entering an order or judgment, the 
clerk must serve notice of the entry, as provided in Rule 5(b), on each party who is not 
in default for failing to appear.  The clerk must record the service on the docket.  A 




v. Am. Bryce Ranches, Inc., 316 F.3d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a “district 
court has the discretion to deny a Rule 4(a)(6) motion even when the rule‟s requirements 
are met”).  Accordingly, we will remand for the District Court to rule on Abulkhair‟s 
Rule 4(a)(6) motion in the first instance.
3
   
 In denying relief under Rule 4(a)(5), the District Court observed that “an excuse 
that Plaintiff did not receive a copy of the Order in time, without additional factual 
support or information, is an excuse that is easily manufactured.”  Insofar as the District 
Court might rely upon this same analysis for purposes of Rule 4(a)(6), we note that 
Abulkhair supports his motion to reopen the appeal period with an Affidavit, submitted 
under penalty of perjury, stating that he did not receive notice of the February 11 order 
until March 29.  Nothing in the present record shows that Abulkhair has “manufactured” 
this contention, and defendants did not oppose the motion to reopen on that basis.  If the 
District Court concludes on remand that findings are warranted on whether Abulkhair has 
fabricated the factual support for his motion, the District Court can conduct appropriate 
proceedings to resolve the issue.  At present, the record reveals no notation on either the 
docket sheet or the February 11 order itself reflecting that the clerk served the order at the 
time it was entered, and Abulkhair asserts that he did not receive notice from defendants.  
                                                                                                                                                             
  
3
  On the issue of timeliness, Abulkhair‟s Rule 4(a)(6) motion could be considered 
timely filed on April 12, 2010, which was fourteen days after March 29, assuming the 
District Court determines that Abulkhair did not receive notice of the February 11 
order at an earlier time.   
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In addition, Abulkhair seems to assert that he is not a registered electronic filer, 
suggesting that the clerk had to serve him by another means specified under Rule 5(b)(2).  
 The District Court also cited Abulkhair‟s failure to monitor the docket as a basis 
for denying Rule 4(a)(5) relief.  For purposes of Rule 4(a)(6), some courts have held that, 
while a district court ultimately exercises its discretion in ruling on a motion to reopen 
the appeal period, “where non-receipt [of an order] has been proven and no other party 
would be prejudiced, the denial of relief cannot rest on a party‟s failure to learn 
independently of the entry of judgment during the thirty-day period for filing notices of 
appeal.”  Nunley v. City of Los Angeles, 52 F.3d 792, 798 (9th Cir. 1995); see Avolio v. 
County of Suffolk, 29 F.3d 50, 54 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that denial of Rule 4(a)(6) 
relief “may not be based on a concept of inexcusable neglect for not having learned of the 
entry of judgment”); but cf. Kuhn v. Sulzer Orthopedics, Inc., 498 F.3d 365, 371 (6th Cir. 
2007) (declining to follow Nunley and Avolio because “[b]oth cases were decided long 
before electronic dockets became widely available”).  This Court has not previously 
addressed the issue, and we need not do so at this time.  Because we will remand this 
matter, the District Court should have the first opportunity to consider the particular 
circumstances at issue here and to determine whether or the extent to which Abulkhair‟s 





 In sum, we will affirm the denial of Abulkhair‟s Rule 4(a)(5) motion, and we will 
remand for the District Court to consider Abulkhair‟s Rule 4(a)(6) motion.   
 (ii) Order restricting the filing of future complaints 
 Abulkhair also challenges the District Court‟s order limiting his right to file future 
complaints related to the underlying car accident at issue.  The District Court entered its 
injunction without addressing Abulkhair‟s objections because it found that Abulkhair 
failed to respond to its February 11 order to show cause.  As discussed above, however, 
Abulkhair asserts that he did not receive notice of the February 11 order until March 29.  
If the District Court were to accept that assertion on remand, then Abulkhair‟s failure to 
respond to the show cause order within the twenty days specified by the District Court 
may be excusable.  Furthermore, Abulkhair filed his Affidavit raising objections to the 
proposed injunction on March 31, which was two days after he purports to have first 
received notice of the February 11 order.   
 We have recognized that “a pattern of groundless and vexatious litigation will 
justify an order prohibiting further filings without permission of the court.”  Chipps v. 
U.S. Dist. Ct., 882 F.2d 72, 73 (3d Cir. 1989); see In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443, 445 (3d 
Cir. 1982) (“It is well within the broad scope of the All Writs Act for a district court to 
issue an order restricting the filing of meritless cases by a litigant whose manifold 
complaints raise claims identical or similar to those that already have been adjudicated.”).  
At the same time, “[a]ccess to the courts is a fundamental tenet of our judicial system,” 
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and “legitimate claims should receive a full and fair hearing no matter how litigious the 
plaintiff may be.”  In re Oliver, 682 F.2d at 446.  It is settled that an injunction against 
filing “should not be imposed by a court without prior notice and some occasion to 
respond.”  Gagliardi v. McWilliams, 834 F.2d 81, 83 (3d Cir. 1987).  
 Because the District Court entered its injunction without addressing the objections 
raised in Abulkhair‟s Affidavit, and without considering whether Abulkhair‟s ability to 
respond in a timely manner was prejudiced by his alleged failure to receive timely notice 
of the February 11 order, we will vacate the July 22 order and remand.  Restricting a 
litigant‟s right to file suit is an “extreme remedy” that warrants meaningful consideration 
of the litigant‟s objections prior to imposition of the injunction.  Abdul-Akbar, 901 F.2d 
at 332.  The District Court should weigh Abulkhair‟s objections on remand against the 
evidence of record and the need to curtail abusive litigation.  We express no view on 
whether an injunction is warranted here; we leave that determination to the District 
Court‟s sound exercise of its discretion. 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the July 23 order insofar as the District 
Court denied Rule 4(a)(5) relief, but we will otherwise vacate the order and remand for 
the District Court to address Abulkhair‟s Rule 4(a)(6) motion.  We will also vacate the 
July 22 injunction order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. 
